Neighborhood Inequality and Violence in
Chicago, 1965–2020
Patrick Sharkey† & Alisabeth Marsteller††
This Essay analyzes trends in violence from a spatial perspective, focusing on
how changes in the murder rate are experienced by communities and groups of residents within the city of Chicago. The Essay argues that a spatial perspective is essential to understanding the causes and consequences of violence in the United
States and begins by describing the social policies and theoretical mechanisms that
explain the connection between concentrated disadvantage and violent crime.
The analysis expands on a long tradition of research in Chicago, and it studies
the distribution of violence in the city’s neighborhoods from 1965 to 2020. It additionally analyzes how the concentration of violence is overlaid with police violence
and incarceration, creating areas of compounded disadvantage. Finally, it compares the recent trends of violence in Chicago with trends across the hundred largest
cities in the United States.
This Essay concludes that addressing the challenge of extreme, persistent segregation by race, ethnicity, and income across Chicago’s neighborhoods is necessary
for producing a sustained reduction both in the city’s overall level of violence and in
the disparities in the levels of violence faced by different neighborhoods.

INTRODUCTION
To understand the causes and consequences of violence in the
United States requires a spatial perspective. Violence is not
evenly distributed across the communities of a city but rather is
concentrated in neighborhoods that experience multiple forms of
disadvantage, from poverty 1 to segregation2 to joblessness. 3 The
† William S. Tod Professor of Sociology and Public Affairs at the Princeton School of
Public and International Affairs.
†† Researcher at Princeton University’s Office of Population Research. The authors
wish to thank the editors at the University of Chicago Law Review, participants at the
Symposium “This Violent City? Rhetoric, Realities, and the Perils and Promise of Reform,”
moderator Aziz Huq and panelist Allegra McLeod for their insights on violence in Chicago,
and Robert Sampson and Michael Maesano for their comments and feedback on the Essay.
1
See Robert J. Sampson & Jeffrey D. Morenoff, Durable Inequality: Spatial Dynamics,
Social Processes, and the Persistence of Poverty in Chicago Neighborhoods, in POVERTY
TRAPS 176, 177–89 (Samuel Bowles et al. eds., 2006).
2
Id. at 183.
3
See Lauren J. Krivo & Ruth D. Peterson, Extremely Disadvantaged Neighborhoods
and Urban Crime, 75 SOC. FORCES 619, 631–41 (1996).
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spatial concentration of violence is driven by long-term patterns
of disinvestment in core community institutions that provide the
foundation for collective life. This creates neighborhoods of concentrated disadvantage that are vulnerable to violence. And the impact of “[v]iolence reverberates around entire communities,” affecting the developmental outcomes of children throughout
neighborhoods and altering daily life and social interactions on
streets, sidewalks, and playgrounds, and in schools, parks, and
local businesses. 4
A spatial perspective on violence means that aggregated
trends in the nation as a whole—or even in individual cities—are
not sufficient to capture how changes in violence are experienced
in different types of neighborhoods and by different segments of
the population. When violence rose in the United States from the
1960s to the 1990s, it was most extreme in areas of concentrated
poverty. 5 When violence fell from the 1990s to the 2010s, the
available evidence suggests that the most-disadvantaged communities experienced the greatest declines in violent crime. 6 We now
write after a period (spanning 2014 to 2020) in which violence has
risen to the highest levels of this century, but little is yet known
about how the rise in violence has been distributed across space.
As part of this Symposium on violence in Chicago, this Essay
describes how these trends in violence have been distributed
across the city’s neighborhoods. The sharp shifts in violence that
have occurred nationwide are mirrored in Chicago, which saw violence rise through the 1990s, then fall through the mid-2010s,
and then rise again after 2014. We adopt a spatial perspective to
analyze these trends, focusing on how changes in violence are experienced by communities and by groups of residents within the
city. This approach follows a long tradition of research set in
Chicago’s neighborhoods. In the first half of the twentieth century, Chicago School Professors Robert Park and Ernest Burgess
analyzed the sorting of Chicago’s population through the neighborhoods of the city; 7 Professors St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton
See PATRICK SHARKEY, UNEASY PEACE: THE GREAT CRIME DECLINE, THE RENEWAL
76–80, 87–90 (2018).
5
See Krivo & Peterson, supra note 3, at 626–31; see also RUTH D. PETERSON & LAUREN
J. KRIVO, DIVERGENT SOCIAL WORLDS: NEIGHBORHOOD CRIME AND THE RACIAL-SPATIAL
DIVIDE 33–37 (2010).
6
See Michael Friedson & Patrick Sharkey, Violence and Neighborhood Disadvantage
After the Crime Decline, 660 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 341, 350 (2015).
7
ROBERT E. PARK, ERNEST W. BURGESS & RODERICK D. MCKENZIE, THE CITY 47–
62 (1925).
4
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documented the forces that affected daily social and economic
life in the city’s racially segregated South Side; 8 and Professors
Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay demonstrated how stable features of specific neighborhoods led to persistently elevated rates
of delinquency—no matter which groups of residents moved into
and out of the neighborhood. 9 More recently, Professor William
Julius Wilson has put forth his theory on the transformation of
urban poverty, using Chicago as his most prominent case study; 10
Professor Mary Pattillo has shown how proximity to areas of concentrated violence altered the lives of the Black middle class; 11
Professor Robert Vargas has focused attention on local political
power and its relationship to patterns of violence; 12 and Professor
Robert Sampson has developed and tested his groundbreaking
theories on community social processes and violence with data
from Chicago’s neighborhoods. 13
To be clear, Chicago is not representative of U.S. cities, and
we will bring in data from the hundred largest U.S. cities in the
last Part of this Essay to analyze the most recent trends in violence
from a national perspective. However, we believe that there is
value in building on the decades of research conducted in Chicago,
a city that has served as a laboratory for social scientists for more
than a century; features rigid segregation by race, ethnicity, and
income; and now has more annual murders than any other city in
the nation.
Beginning with the fact that violence is concentrated in areas
characterized by racial segregation and economic disadvantage,
the first Part describes the historical forces and theoretical mechanisms linking concentrated disadvantage and violence in urban
neighborhoods in the United States. Next, we turn to data from
Chicago’s neighborhoods. Pulling together several data sets, we
analyze how violence has been distributed across Chicago’s neighborhoods over the past fifty-six years. We then expand outward
See generally ST. CLAIR DRAKE & HORACE R. CLAYTON, BLACK METROPOLIS: A
STUDY OF NEGRO LIFE IN A NORTHERN CITY (1945).
9
See CLIFFORD R. SHAW & HENRY D. MCKAY, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND URBAN
AREAS 67–89 (rev. ed. 1969).
10 See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987); William
Julius Wilson, When Work Disappears, 111 POL. SCI. Q. 567 (1996).
11 MARY PATTILLO, BLACK PICKET FENCES: PRIVILEGE AND PERIL AMONG THE BLACK
MIDDLE CLASS 29 (2013).
12 See generally ROBERT VARGAS, WOUNDED CITY: VIOLENT TURF WARS IN A CHICAGO
BARRIO (2016).
13 See generally ROBERT J. SAMPSON, GREAT AMERICAN CITY: CHICAGO AND THE
ENDURING NEIGHBORHOOD EFFECT (2012).
8
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to incorporate data from the hundred largest U.S. cities, and we
focus on the rise of violence that has occurred in Chicago and most
other U.S. cities from 2014 to 2020. Lastly, we consider the way
that concentrated violence is compounded by the spatial concentration of incarceration and police violence.
I. THE SPATIAL LINK BETWEEN CONCENTRATED DISADVANTAGE
AND VIOLENCE
In cities with relatively high levels of violence, some communities are untouched by shootings and assaults, while others experience extreme incidents of violence on a regular basis. One of
the most robust findings about violence is its concentration within
a small number of street segments, intersections, city blocks, and
neighborhoods. 14 The spatial distribution of violence has been
shown to persist over long periods of time and to be tightly linked
with segregation by economic status, race, and ethnicity. 15 The
question that motivates this Section of the Essay is why.
A. Abandonment and Punishment
From the 1940s to the 1960s, a set of social and economic
forces combined with federal, state, and local policies to create a
crisis in U.S. cities. Pollution from factories and cars turned skies
hazy and made rivers toxic. Federal investment in the interstate
highway system federal subsidies for home mortgages led to a
large-scale movement of people and firms out of central cities.16
The migration from central cities was largely restricted to White
middle-class residents who were able to afford a car and take advantage of subsidies for home ownership, but it also included
Black middle-class residents who took advantage of advances in
14 See Anthony A. Braga, Andrew V. Papachristos & David M. Hureau, The Concentration and Stability of Gun Violence at Micro Places in Boston, 1980–2008, 26 J. QUANT.
CRIMINOLOGY 33, 48 (2010); see also Anthony A. Braga, David M. Hureau & Andrew V.
Papachristos, The Relevance of Micro Places to Citywide Robbery Trends: A Longitudinal
Analysis of Robbery Incidents at Street Corners and Block Faces in Boston, 48 J. RSCH.
CRIME & DELINQ. 7, 19–24 (2011); David Weisburd, Shawn Bushway, Cynthia Lum &
Sue-Ming Yang, Trajectories of Crime at Places: A Longitudinal Study of Street Segments
in the City of Seattle, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 283, 310 (2004) (examining data from Seattle to
find that “crime is tightly clustered in specific places in urban areas” and that “there is a
high degree of stability of crime at micro places over time”).
15 See generally Sampson & Morenoff, supra note 1. See also SAMPSON, supra note 13,
at 97–120.
16 See Charles J. Orlebeke, The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949 to
1999, 11 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 489, 497 (2000); Wilson, supra note 10, at 583; WILSON,
supra note 10, at 50–55, 135–38.
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fair housing to move into neighborhoods outside central cities.
This class-based migration not only reduced revenue for city governments but also led to a new form of concentrated poverty
among those left behind. As central-city populations shifted and
steady jobs in the manufacturing sector began to disappear, unemployment and dependence on welfare became more common,
and poverty, homelessness, and addiction became more visible on
city streets. 17 Violence rose sharply in the 1960s and continued to
rise through the early 1990s. 18
Political power at the state level shifted from central cities to
suburbs, and the people and communities left behind lost political
influence and government funding. As city governments were
starved of resources, public-housing complexes and schools deteriorated, sidewalks were not maintained, and public parks were
left untended. The crisis in U.S. cities culminated in a wave of
anger, grief, protest, destruction, and violence that spread
through hundreds of U.S. cities from 1963 through 1968, peaking
in the days after Martin Luther King Jr.’s assassination. 19
A national approach to dealing with the urban crisis formed
and solidified during this period. Instead of responding to this set
of challenges with investments in central-city communities, the
federal government disengaged from urban issues and responded
with punitive social policies that have exacerbated the problems
faced by urban populations—an approach characterized by abandonment and punishment. 20
The abandonment of central cities began under President
Richard Nixon, who argued that urban neighborhoods should be
left on their own to deal with rising poverty and joblessness.
President Nixon’s advisor Daniel Patrick Moynihan labeled this
17 See generally WILSON, supra note 10 (discussing the economic, demographic, and
political forces that led to concentrated poverty in central-city neighborhoods). See also
BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 49–
66 (1982).
18 See Patrick Sharkey & Robert J. Sampson, Violence, Cognition, and Neighborhood Inequality in America, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 320, 328 (Russell K. Schutt et al.
eds., 2015).
19 See Lorraine Boissoneault, Martin Luther King Jr.’s Assassination Sparked Uprisings in Cities Across America, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://perma.cc/C4VF-RY8L.
20 See Loïc J.D. Wacquant, Negative Social Capital: State Breakdown and Social
Destitution in America’s Urban Core, 13 NETH. J. HOUS. & BUILT ENV’T 25, 28–29 (1998)
(discussing “state abandonment,” which contributed to “organizational decline” and rising
joblessness and poverty in the ghettos of major cities). These patterns were exacerbated
by the decline in the influence of central cities in state-governmental policy. See Margaret
Weir, Central Cities’ Loss of Power in State Politics, 2 CITYSCAPE, May 1996, at 23, 24–26.
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approach when he called for a period of “benign neglect.” 21 Federal
aid to cities rose substantially from the end of World War II to the
mid-1960s, but it has been wildly erratic in subsequent decades,
especially for housing. 22 The fluctuations in aid, combined with
the efforts of several presidential administrations to effectively
incapacitate the Department of Housing and Urban Development,
made it difficult for local housing agencies to create sustained financial support for public housing projects, contributing to the
rapid deterioration of projects in many central cities.
Beyond the issue of federal aid to cities, the scale of total federal spending on social transfers has consistently lagged behind
other developed nations. 23 In the 1960s, several prominent reports and proposals were put forth to confront the challenge of
urban inequality with massive federal investment and collective
mobilization, but these plans never became law. 24 In the subsequent decades, federal investments in central cities have typically
been implemented on a small scale and only for a limited time
frame. Never has there been a systematic effort to deal with the
problem of urban poverty through sustained, large-scale investments in the people and the institutions of the nation’s urban
neighborhoods. Our national urban policy has been characterized
by abandonment rather than investment.
Punishment, on the other hand, has been the most consistent
response to the challenges of urban crime, violence, and poverty.
Criminal justice policy is carried out primarily at the state and local levels, yet the approach and priorities of the federal government
influence the policy regimes that are implemented by state,
county, and city governments, prosecutors, and police departments. One of the clear signals of the punitive response to the
urban crisis came late in Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, when he
signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 25
The Act allocated $400 million in grants to strengthen law

DEAN J. KOTLOWSKI, NIXON’S CIVIL RIGHTS 173 (2001).
See CHARLES M. HAAR & DEMETRIUS S. IATRIDIS, HOUSING THE POOR IN SUBURBIA:
PUBLIC POLICY AT THE GRASS ROOTS, 319–22 (1974); Demetrios Caraley, Washington Abandons the Cities, 107 POL. SCI. Q. 1, 7–12 (1992); ALEXANDER VON HOFFMAN, HOUSE BY
HOUSE, BLOCK BY BLOCK: THE REBIRTH OF AMERICA’S URBAN NEIGHBORHOODS 7–14 (2003).
23 John Clegg & Adaner Usmani, The Economic Origins of Mass Incarceration,
CATALYST, Fall 2019, at 9, 43.
24 Id. at 34–40; see also NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIV. DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 11–13, 229–63 (1968).
25 Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S. Code).
21
22
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enforcement, provided forgivable loans and grants for officers to
receive training and education, and allowed federal funds to be
used to bolster police salaries and train officers “to ease tensions
in ghetto neighborhoods.” 26 This change in approach reflected a
widespread shift in public opinion, as both Black and White
Americans expressed increasingly punitive attitudes as violence
began to rise in the 1960s. 27
The punitive response to the urban crisis escalated under
President Nixon. It then turned into a large-scale “War on Drugs”
under President Ronald Reagan and persisted under subsequent
administrations. 28 President Bill Clinton added tens of thousands
of new police officers to U.S. streets when he signed the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 29 (VCCA). The
Act provided grants encouraging states to implement reforms
that would require individuals convicted of violent crimes to serve
at least 85% of their sentences. 30
Although these pieces of federal legislation have received
much attention, it was state and local policies that played the
greatest role in contributing to the exponential rise in the rate of
incarceration in the United States since 1970. Harsh state policies, such as eliminating parole and establishing mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses and violent crimes, combined
with more aggressive policing and prosecution at the local level to
push more Americans into the criminal legal system and keep
them in the system for longer. 31
While the most consequential criminal justice policies did not
come from the federal government, it is essential to recognize the
connections between the local shift toward punishment and the
federal shift toward abandoning central cities. It is precisely
26 Statement by the President upon Signing the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968, 1 PUB. PAPERS 725 (June 19, 1968).
27 See PETER K. ENNS, INCARCERATION NATION 31–39 (2016); Clegg & Usmani, supra
note 23, at 30–32. See generally JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN (2017) (describing how Black officials and community leaders played a role in shaping public opinion
and punitive criminal enforcement policies); Vesla M. Weaver, Frontlash: Race and the
Development of Punitive Crime Policy, 21 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 230 (2007) (discussing the
politics and development of punitive crime policy).
28 See ELIZABETH HINTON, FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO THE WAR ON CRIME 307–
32 (2016).
29 Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S. Code).
30 VCCA § 20102, 108 Stat. at 1816.
31 See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND
HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 21–31 (2017).
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because the federal government did not take the difficult steps
required to confront urban poverty, economic dislocation, and the
resulting violence and unrest that local governments and officials
were left to rely on the police and prisons. Instead of a policy regime based on justice and investment, the nation chose a regime
based on abandonment and punishment.
B. Mechanisms Linking Concentrated Disadvantage with
Violence
The political, social, and economic forces outlined in the previous Section created the conditions for concentrated disadvantage, institutional decay, and violent crime. 32 The first pathway through which these relationships operate is institutional.
As political influence and state resources decline, core community
institutions like schools, daycare centers, parks, playgrounds, libraries, and other features of the built environment are less likely
to be supported and maintained. Fluctuations in funding for public and affordable housing, for instance, led to declining conditions
of housing developments in many central cities. 33 Flagging investment in local infrastructure leads to poorly lit spaces, abandoned
lots, and empty buildings that are vulnerable to becoming areas
of violence. 34 Ethnographic research in Chicago and Philadelphia
demonstrates how the threat of violence leads residents to retreat

32 See PETER DREIER, JOHN MOLLENKOPF & TODD SWANSTROM, PLACE MATTERS
107–12 (2001); see also DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID
9 (1993) (arguing that racial segregation is “the key structural factor[ ] responsible for the
perpetuation of black poverty”); PATRICK SHARKEY, STUCK IN PLACE 5 (2013) (examining
how “political decisions and social policies have led to severe disinvestment and persistent,
rigid segregation”). See generally Robert J. Sampson & William Julius Wilson, Toward a
Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality, in CRIME AND INEQUALITY 37 (John Hagan
& Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995) (developing a conceptual model to explain the connection
between concentrated disadvantage, segregation, and violence).
33 See Caraley, supra note 22, at 7–12; Jason DeParle, Slamming the Door, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 1996), https://perma.cc/58NQ-UNWC; DREIER ET AL., supra note 32, at
107–12; ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 125–43 (2d ed. 2006);
VON HOFFMAN, supra note 22, at 7–14. See generally Orlebeke, supra note 16.
34 See generally Michelle C. Kondo, Elena Andreyeva, Eugenia C. South, John M.
MacDonald & Charles C. Branas, Neighborhood Interventions to Reduce Violence, 39 ANN.
REV. PUB. HEALTH 253 (2018). See also Aaron Chalfin, Benjamin Hansen, Jason Lerner &
Lucie Parker, Reducing Crime Through Environmental Design: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment of Street Lighting in New York City, J. QUANT. CRIMINOLOGY, Jan. 11,
2021, https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10940-020-09490-6; ERIC KLINENBERG,
PALACES FOR THE PEOPLE: HOW SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE CAN HELP FIGHT INEQUALITY,
POLARIZATION, AND THE DECLINE OF CIVIC LIFE 63–71 (2018).
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from public spaces, creating “no-go zones” that deteriorate over
time and schools that resemble prisons. 35
A second pathway operates through social processes at the
level of street blocks and neighborhoods. Concentrated poverty
can disrupt local processes of community mobilization and informal social control that limit violence. Sampson’s research on
collective efficacy demonstrates how the concentration of social
and economic disadvantage can undermine social cohesion and
trust among residents, making it less likely that they will take
active steps to reinforce shared expectations for behavior and
work together to act in the community’s common interest. 36 Using
data from clusters of neighborhoods in Chicago, Sampson and his
collaborators showed that collective efficacy mediates the relationship between community residents’ economic and demographic
characteristics and violence, a finding that has been replicated in
a wide array of settings and time periods.
Theory on concentrated disadvantage, institutional decay,
and collective efficacy leads to a clear conclusion: violence is a
consequence of urban inequality. It is a product of segregation,
disinvestment, abandonment, and the resulting decline in community institutions and community organization. But the relationship
between disadvantage and violence is reciprocal—urban inequality
creates the conditions for violence, and community violence then
amplifies inequality, creating the potential for self-reinforcing
change. 37
The amplifying effects of violence on social and economic inequality work through both direct and indirect pathways. Community violence affects the outcomes of young people living within
violent neighborhoods directly, with consequences for cognitive
functioning, academic performance, stress hormones, and sleep.38
35 See ELIJAH ANDERSON, STREETWISE: RACE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN
COMMUNITY 1–2, 237–52 (1990); DAVID J. HARDING, LIVING THE DRAMA: COMMUNITY,
CONFLICT, AND CULTURE AMONG INNER-CITY BOYS 72, 151 (2010); ERIC KLINENBERG,
HEAT WAVE: A SOCIAL AUTOPSY OF DISASTER IN CHICAGO 56 (2002); LOÏC WACQUANT, URBAN
OUTCASTS: A COMPARATIVE SOCIOLOGY OF ADVANCED MARGINALITY 53–56 (2008).
36 See generally Robert J. Sampson, Stephen W. Raudenbush & Felton Earls,
Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy, 277 SCIENCE
918 (1997).
37 See Sharkey & Sampson, supra note 18, at 329.
38 See Patrick Sharkey, The Long Reach of Violence: A Broader Perspective on Data,
Theory, and Evidence on the Prevalence and Consequences of Exposure to Violence, 1 ANN.
REV. CRIMINOLOGY 85, 93–97 (2018); Jennifer A. Heissel, Patrick T. Sharkey, Gerard
Torrats-Espinosa, Kathryn Grant & Emma K. Adam, Violence and Vigilance: The Acute
Effects of Community Violent Crime on Sleep and Cortisol, 89 CHILD DEV. e323, e326–e330
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These acute impacts of violent events translate into long-term
consequences, as demonstrated in research showing the impact
that growing up in violent neighborhoods has on children’s academic trajectories and economic outcomes in early adulthood. 39
Beyond the direct effects of violence on community residents,
the prevalence of violence leads to disinvestment in communities.
Community violence translates into fear of public spaces and
leads families to seek to leave their neighborhoods. 40 The threat
of victimization alters young people’s behavior and network formation, leading some to form friendships with older peers to obtain
protection in public spaces. 41 Increases in murder and robbery in
cities are strong predictors of migration from central cities,42
which amplifies racial, ethnic, and economic segregation. As
spaces empty out, business activity dries up, entry-level jobs become scarce, and physical signs of abandonment and disorder
alter the perception of a community in ways that can persist for
decades. 43
In the context of U.S. cities, concentrated disadvantage and
violence frequently lead to a shift in the central institutions and
actors within a neighborhood. Representatives of the criminal
justice system—including police officers, parole officers, school
safety officers, and detectives—become dominant figures in public
spaces, and squad cars, sirens, and police tape become common
features of the landscape. 44
(2018) (describing the effects of violence on sleep). See generally Patrick Sharkey, The
Acute Effect of Local Homicides on Children’s Cognitive Performance 107 PROC. NAT’L
ACAD. SCI. 11733 (2010) (exploring the effects of local violence on cognitive functioning).
39 See generally Gerard Torrats-Espinosa, Crime and Inequality in Academic
Achievement Across School Districts in the United States, 57 DEMOGRAPHY 123 (2020). See
also Patrick Sharkey & Gerard Torrats-Espinosa, The Effect of Violent Crime on Economic
Mobility, 102 J. URB. ECON. 22, 29–31 (2017).
40 See WESLEY G. SKOGAN, DISORDER AND DECLINE 65–84 (1990). See generally Jeffrey
D. Morenoff & Robert J. Sampson, Violent Crime and the Spatial Dynamics of Neighborhood
Transition: Chicago, 1970-1990, 76 SOC. FORCES 31 (1997).
41 HARDING, supra note 35, at 81–84.
42 See Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences for Cities, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159, 165–66 (1999); see also Robert J. Sampson
& John D. Wooldredge, Evidence That High Crime Rates Encourage Migration Away from
Central Cities, 70 SOCIO. & SOC. RSCH. 310, 310–14 (1986); Allen E. Liska & Paul E. Bellair,
Violent-Crime Rates and Racial Composition: Convergence over Time, 101 AM. J. SOCIO.
578, 599–600 (1995).
43 See SAMPSON, supra note 13, at 146 (finding that perceptions of disorder appear
to be “a mechanism of durable inequality”).
44 In his book Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner
City, Professor Elijah Anderson portrays the police as a presence weaved into the disadvantaged urban neighborhoods. See ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY,
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In the next Part, we document how the connection between
community characteristics and violence has changed in the neighborhoods of Chicago over fifty-six years. We then expand outward
to the hundred largest cities in the nation and document how the
rise of violence since 2014 has been experienced across segments
of the population characterized by race, ethnicity, and income.
II. NEIGHBORHOOD INEQUALITY AND VIOLENCE IN CHICAGO,
1965–2020
Our analysis begins with a focus on trends in murder in Chicago
from 1965 to 2020. Murder counts by 1990 census tracts from
the years 1965–1995 are from the Homicides in Chicago data set
created and published by Carolyn Rebecca Block and Professor
Richard Block, and murder data from more recent years are from
publicly available sources including the Chicago Data Portal.45
Because census-tract boundaries change over time, we convert all
census tracts to 2010 tract boundaries using the Longitudinal
Tract Database. 46
The murder rate is calculated by summing the total number
of murders within a specific geography and time period, dividing
by the total population of that geography in the time period, and
then either multiplying the resulting quotient by 100,000 for
Chicago overall or multiplying the resulting quotient by 10,000
for Chicago’s neighborhoods. The tract-level rate is used as the
basis for two additional measures: average neighborhood rate and
average exposure rate.
The neighborhood rate is a measure of average violent crime
within a geographic space, which, for our analysis, is a census
tract. To create the neighborhood rate, census tracts are divided
into groups of “poor” and “nonpoor” neighborhoods based on

VIOLENCE, AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 22 (2000) (describing a police car
parked at a corner by a charred McDonald’s sign); id. at 140 (describing police presence at
a funeral of a victim of a violent crime and how “the cops sit and watch the crowd come
and go”); id. at 320 (“In the community the police are often on the streets.”). See generally
ALICE GOFFMAN, ON THE RUN: FUGITIVE LIFE IN AN AMERICAN CITY (2014).
45 Carolyn Rebecca Block & Richard L. Block, Homicides in Chicago, 1965–1995 (ICPSR
6399), NAT’L ARCHIVE CRIM. JUST. DATA (July 6, 2005), https://perma.cc/39KB-SRC9; Crimes 2001 to Present, CHI. DATA PORTAL (Sept. 4, 2021), https://perma.cc/2Q3W-UBEK. We
include all incidents where the Description field includes the terms “MURDER” or
“HOMICIDE” and does not include “RECKLESS,” and the Primary Type field includes
the terms “MURDER” or “HOMICIDE.”
46 John Logan, Zengwang Xu & Brian Stults, Census Geography: Bridging Data for
Census Tracts Across Time, DIVERSITY & DISPARITIES, https://perma.cc/H2TS-HJXH.
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whether at least 30% of the neighborhoods’ residents were in poverty. In addition, neighborhoods are divided into “majority-Black”
and “majority-White” groups based on whether at least 50% of the
neighborhoods’ residents were Black or White. We calculate these
neighborhood percentages using a five-year rolling average to
reduce any noise due to year-to-year changes in neighborhood
classifications. The average neighborhood rate is the average of
the murder rates for each group of neighborhoods—poor, nonpoor,
majority Black, and majority White—in each year. Comparing
neighborhood murder rates between census tracts with different
population attributes can reveal the extent to which geographic
segregation by violence is related to geographic segregation by
poverty and by race or ethnicity.
The exposure rate is a population group’s average rate of exposure to murder across all census tracts in which members of
that group reside, which is computed separately for different
groups within the population: all residents, residents living below
the poverty line (“poor”), residents not living below the poverty
line (“nonpoor”), Black residents, White residents, and residents
of all other racial and ethnic groups. 47 The exposure rate is calculated by taking the average murder rate of all census tracts
weighted by the fraction of the city’s residents in that group who
reside in each tract, as represented by the following equation:
𝑃𝑃

∑𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 � 𝑗𝑗 �.
𝑃𝑃
𝑡𝑡

Here, 𝑗𝑗 is a census tract in Chicago, 𝑉𝑉𝑗𝑗 is the murder rate per
10,000 residents in tract 𝑗𝑗, 𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 is the total population in tract 𝑗𝑗 of
the group for which the exposure is being calculated, and 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 is the
total population of the group in the entire city. The exposure rate
of a group of residents, when combined with the average murder
rate of neighborhoods in which that group is the majority, is an
indication of how strongly the group’s exposure to violence is related to geographic segregation.
A. Stability in the Spatial Distribution of Violence
Figure 1 shows the murder rate in the city as a whole over a
period spanning from 1965 to 2020. From the 1960s through the
47 Other racial categories are not included because the 1970 Census did not collect
accurate data on the racial status of people who aren’t White or Black. All other races are
indicated as “[a]ll other races population.” U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, Census Users’ Dictionary,
in 1970 CENSUS: USERS’ GUIDE 72, 95 (1970), https://perma.cc/N2CM-KFSY.
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early 1990s, the murder rate rose from 11.6 per 100,000 to its
peak of 32.8 murders per 100,000 in 1992. The city then experienced a sharp decline as the murder rate fell to 15.7 murders per
100,000 in 2014. In the six years since, the murder rate has risen
back to 28.8 murders per 100,000, erasing most of the earlier decline in violence.
FIGURE 1: MURDERS PER 100,000 RESIDENTS IN CHICAGO,
1965–2020.

Despite the stark changes in violence that the city has been
through, the spatial distribution of murders within the city has
been extremely stable. Figure 2 displays heat maps showing the
number of murders in Chicago’s census tracts in five-year increments from 1965 to 1985 and from 2000 to 2020. 48 Although the
precise locations of the most extreme violence within the city have
shifted over time, the maps reveal a set of neighborhoods in the
South and West Sides of the city that have consistently been the
most violent neighborhoods of Chicago. The overall level of violence
has fluctuated, but the distribution of violence has been remarkably consistent.

48

The homicide numbers for 1965 are added to the 1966–1970 time period.
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FIGURE 2: TOTAL MURDERS BY CENSUS TRACT IN CHICAGO,
BROKEN INTO TWO PERIODS, 1965–1985 AND 2000–2020

This conclusion is reinforced in Figure 3, which shows trends
in the average murder rate of census tracts divided into quintiles
based on the murder rate in the first six years of the fifty-six-year
period (1965–1970). For example, the fifth quintile represents the
most-violent fifth of all census tracts in Chicago in the time period
1965–1970, and the first quintile represents the least-violent
tracts over the same period. Figure 3 shows that the neighborhoods in the first four quintiles move together over this period,
with minimal changes in their relative levels of violence. The two
least-violent fifths of Chicago’s neighborhoods in the late 1960s
remained the least-violent neighborhoods for the next five decades, and both the third and fourth quintiles of neighborhoods
remained in the same relative position over the full period.
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FIGURE 3: AVERAGE MURDERS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS BY
QUINTILE BASED ON 1965–1970 MURDER RATE IN CHICAGO,
1965–2020.

The most-violent neighborhoods in Chicago, on the other
hand, have not followed the same trends as the neighborhoods in
the remainder of the city. For instance, as violence was rising
throughout the city from the mid-1960s through the mid-1990s,
the murder rate in the most-violent fifth of neighborhoods from
1965–1970 was steadily falling through 1990. The level of violence in this group of neighborhoods then fell sharply through the
mid-2010s before rising again after 2015. Despite these changes,
the most-violent fifth of neighborhoods in the late 1960s continued to have the highest level of violence throughout the entire
period. There has been very little spatial redistribution of violence
over the past fifty-six years.
B. Violence and Segregation in Chicago Neighborhoods
In the next analysis, we assess changes in the connection between the concentration of violence and economic, racial, and ethnic segregation. Figure 4a shows trends in average violence for
neighborhoods grouped by poverty level. The average murder rate
in poor neighborhoods before the 2014–2020 time period was at
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its highest in 1970, with about 9.3 murders per 10,000 residents.
The murder rate in poor neighborhoods declined throughout the
1990s and 2000s, reaching 4.1 murders per 10,000 residents in
2013. That period of decline in the murder rate of poor neighborhoods has been almost undone in recent years, as the murder rate
has nearly surpassed its 1970 peak with about 9.2 murders per
10,000 residents in 2020. The murder rate for poor neighborhoods
follows the same trajectory as Chicago’s overall trend—as shown
in Figure 1—but with higher peak levels of violence and larger
fluctuations compared to the trend in the murder rate of nonpoor
neighborhoods, which has remained relatively flat throughout the
fifty-six years. Because nonpoor neighborhoods experienced relatively stable levels of violence throughout the time period, Figure 4b shows that both the ratio of and difference in murder rates
between poor and nonpoor neighborhoods largely follow the pattern of trends in murder in poor neighborhoods. The neighborhood poverty gap in violence was slightly ameliorated by the decline in murder from the 1990s through the 2000s, but the
concentration of violence in poor communities has remained a
consistent feature over the fifty-six-year period.
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FIGURE 4: (a) AVERAGE NEIGHBORHOOD MURDERS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS FOR POOR AND NONPOOR NEIGHBORHOODS IN
CHICAGO, 1965–2020. (b) RATIO OF AND DIFFERENCE IN
NEIGHBORHOOD MURDERS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS FOR POOR
VERSUS NONPOOR NEIGHBORHOODS IN CHICAGO, 1965–2020.
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Figures 5a and 5b focus attention on trends in violence in
majority-Black and majority-White neighborhoods. As shown in
Figure 5a, the murder rate in majority-Black neighborhoods has
fluctuated largely in tandem with the overall murder rate in the
city, but it rose in 2020 to its highest level in the entire fifty-sixyear time period with about 9.0 murders per 10,000 residents.
The level of violence in majority-White neighborhoods peaked in
1979 and has slowly fallen since then, rising only slightly in the
years from 2015 to 2020. These divergent trends mean that both
the difference in and ratio of the murder rates between majorityBlack and majority-White neighborhoods have grown substantially over time. In the early 1960s, the murder rate in predominantly Black neighborhoods was roughly five times as high as in
predominantly White neighborhoods, but by 2020 the rate was over
ten times as high in majority-Black neighborhoods as in majorityWhite neighborhoods. Similarly to the relationship between
neighborhood violence and poverty, higher rates of violence are
concentrated in communities segregated by race.
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FIGURE 5: (a) AVERAGE NEIGHBORHOOD MURDERS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS FOR MAJORITY-BLACK AND MAJORITY-WHITE
NEIGHBORHOODS IN CHICAGO, 1965–2020. (b) RATIO OF AND
DIFFERENCE IN NEIGHBORHOOD MURDERS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS FOR MAJORITY-BLACK VERSUS MAJORITYWHITE NEIGHBORHOODS IN CHICAGO, 1965–2020.

368

The University of Chicago Law Review

[89:2

C. The Distribution of Violence Across Segments of the
Population
Shifting the level of analysis from neighborhoods to groups of
residents, we next consider trends in different groups’ exposures
to community violence over the full period from 1965 to 2020.
Figure 6a shows trends in average poor and nonpoor residents’
levels of exposure to community violence. Both groups’ levels of
exposure to violence have followed similar trends over time, but
the average poor resident has consistently been exposed to
greater rates of lethal community violence than the average
nonpoor resident. Figure 6b illustrates this gap by showing the
difference in poor and nonpoor residents’ exposure rates as well
as the ratio of poor to nonpoor exposure rates. The ratio of the
exposure rate to community violence between the average poor
and nonpoor resident of the city has remained extremely stable
over time, fluctuating just above or below 2 for the period’s duration. In other words, the city’s poor residents have lived in neighborhoods with roughly twice the level of violence as those of
nonpoor residents from 1965 all the way through 2020. The raw
difference in exposure rates has followed the overall trend of violence, reaching a peak of 2.9 in 1991 and declining as the overall
magnitude in murder rates declined through 2014.
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FIGURE 6: (a) EXPOSURE TO MURDERS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS FOR
POOR AND NONPOOR RESIDENTS IN CHICAGO, 1965–2020.
(b) RATIO OF AND DIFFERENCE IN EXPOSURE TO MURDERS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS FOR POOR VERSUS NONPOOR RESIDENTS IN
CHICAGO, 1965–2020.
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This same analysis is repeated for Black, White, and all other
residents of Chicago in Figures 7a and 7b. As shown in Figure 7a,
trends in exposure rates for Black Americans have followed the
same pattern as trends in violence for the city as a whole (see
Figure 1). The overall increase in murders between 2014 and 2020
has disproportionately affected Black residents, as they have experienced an increase in exposure rates from 3.5 murders per
10,000 residents in 2014 to 6.7 in 2020—compared to increases
from 0.6 in 2014 to 1.1 in 2020 for White residents and from 1.0
in 2014 to 1.7 in 2020 for all other racial or ethnic groups. In 2020,
the murder rate in the average Black resident’s neighborhood
rose to its highest point in the fifty-six-year period. Similarly, the
ratio of the exposure rate for Black residents to White residents
has been rising—with fluctuations—since the 1970s. The average
exposure rate for Black residents in the late 1970s was roughly
three times as high as the exposure rate for White residents at
the same time but was almost seven times higher by 2020.
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FIGURE 7: (a) EXPOSURE TO MURDERS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS FOR
BLACK RESIDENTS, WHITE RESIDENTS, AND RESIDENTS OF ALL
OTHER ETHNIC OR RACIAL GROUPS IN CHICAGO, 1965–2020.
(b) RATIO OF AND DIFFERENCE IN EXPOSURE TO MURDERS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS FOR BLACK RESIDENTS VERSUS WHITE
RESIDENTS IN CHICAGO, 1965–2020.
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The last analysis in this Section pushes further by considering
trends in exposure rates for Black residents who live in majorityBlack neighborhoods and Black residents who do not. As is visible
in Figure 8, trends in exposure rates for Black residents who live
in majority-Black neighborhoods precisely mirror the trends for
all Black residents, whereas the trends in exposure rates for
Black residents who live outside majority-Black neighborhoods
follow an entirely different trajectory. This graph reinforces the
point that racial gaps in exposure to community violence are
driven by spatial segregation. Black Chicago residents live in
more violent neighborhoods only if they live in majority-Black
neighborhoods.
FIGURE 8: EXPOSURE TO MURDERS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS FOR
BLACK RESIDENTS OVERALL, BLACK RESIDENTS INSIDE MAJORITYBLACK NEIGHBORHOODS, AND BLACK RESIDENTS OUTSIDE
MAJORITY-BLACK NEIGHBORHOODS IN CHICAGO, 1965–2020.

D. Punishment and Compounded Disadvantage
We began this Essay by arguing that a policy regime characterized by abandonment and punishment created a spatial link
between concentrated disadvantage and community violence. The
second component of that regime has relied on the institutions of
law enforcement and the criminal legal system to deal with the
challenges of violent crime and associated problems that are more
common in areas with extreme urban inequality. The result is a
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spatial configuration of compounded disadvantage in which the
concentration of disadvantage and violence is overlaid with the
markings of the institutions of punishment.
To analyze the distribution of compounded disadvantage in
Chicago, we use data on police shootings from 2014 to 2020 made
publicly available by the Gun Violence Archive 49 (GVA). Police
shootings are the total number of victims killed in incidents in
which a police officer shot the suspect. 50 Data on tract-level male
incarceration rates are collected by The Opportunity Atlas.51
Neighborhoods are divided into quintiles based on the ranking of
their murder rate across the 2014 to 2020 time period. For simplicity, the second, third, and fourth quintiles are merged into one
group labeled “Middle Quintiles.” We calculate a single average
police-shootings rate from 2014 to 2020 for the highest, lowest,
and middle quintiles and by race or ethnicity and poverty level.52
We do the same process for male incarceration rates. The racial
and ethnic categories additionally include Asian Americans and
Pacific Islanders (AAPI) as well as Hispanics. 53
Figure 9 contains heat maps comparing the spatial distribution of murders, police shootings, and male incarceration by census
tract. The highest rates of male incarceration are concentrated in
the West and South Sides of Chicago—the same two regions of
neighborhoods with the most violence. Although harder to identify
due to the lower frequency of police shootings, the areas in which
police shootings occurred from 2014 to 2020 also match those communities with the highest murder rates. Table 1 quantifies the
extent of concentration by displaying rates of male incarceration
and police shootings by level of violence from 2014 to 2020, race
or ethnicity, and poverty level. Table 1 shows that the neighborhoods characterized by higher rates of violence, a majority-Black
population, and a large poor population all experienced rates of
police shootings between two and nine times higher than

49 Search
Incidents,
GUN
VIOLENCE
ARCHIVE,
available
at
https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/query.
50 These are incidents that contain the characteristic “Officer Involved Shooting subject/suspect/perpetrator killed.”
51 See Raj Chetty, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hendren, Maggie R. Jones & Sonya
R. Porter, The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social Mobility 18–42
(Ctr. for Econ. Stud., Working Paper No. CES 18-42, 2018).
52 We assign a single poverty level and race/ethnicity classification for each neighborhood by summarizing population data across the entire seven-year period (2014 to 2020).
53 2010 Census Summary File 1, in 2010 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING
(2012), https://perma.cc/6MC3-V4QN
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neighborhoods characterized by lower levels of violence, a different racial or ethnic composition, and a smaller poor population.
The same pattern is true for male incarceration rates. Neighborhoods that are segregated by both race or ethnicity and economic
status and that are disproportionately affected by higher rates of
violence experience the additional disadvantage of higher police
shootings and incarceration rates.
FIGURE 9: COMPARISON BETWEEN THE SPATIAL DISTRIBUTIONS
OF SHOOTINGS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS FROM 2014 THROUGH
2020, MALE INCARCERATIONS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS IN 2010,
AND POLICE SHOOTINGS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS FROM 2014
THROUGH 2020 IN CHICAGO.

This compounded disadvantage, however, is not a strictly recent pattern. Table 2 shows the same information as Table 1 but
is conditioned on data from 1965 to 1970 instead of from 2014 to
2020. The census tracts with the highest murder rates from the
1960s experienced the highest rates of police shootings and male
incarceration over fifty years later. Neighborhoods that were
majority-Black in the 1960s also experienced higher rates of police
shootings and male incarceration in later years as compared to
neighborhoods of different racial or ethnic composition, as did
poor neighborhoods compared to nonpoor neighborhoods. This
explicitly illustrates the persistence of disadvantage in communities that now experience another form of inequality in the form of
policing and imprisonment.
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E. The National Rise in Violence, 2014–2020
We have shown how the rise in violence in Chicago from 2014
to 2020 erased the declines in neighborhood inequality that resulted from the period of falling violence spanning from the early
1990s to the mid-2010s. Chicago’s racial gap in exposure to community violence is now wider than it has been at any point since
1965. In this concluding Section, we expand our view beyond
Chicago to consider the hundred largest cities in the United
States, and we analyze the degree to which the findings from
Chicago extend to other U.S. cities.
We draw on fatal-shootings data tabulated by the GVA to
summarize the recent rise in violence on a national level from
2014 to 2020. Fatal shootings count the total number of victims
killed in incidents that did not involve accidental death or death
by suicide. 54 The methods of generating the average-exposure
rates and the average-neighborhood rates are the same as those
used in the Chicago analysis. 55 The initial shooting rates (in 2014)
are compared to the final shooting rates (in 2020) for all tracts
combined—by race or ethnicity and by poverty.
Just as prior research has shown that the benefits of the
1990s decline in violence was most pronounced in segregated,
low-income neighborhoods, the recent rise in violence has also
been concentrated in areas characterized by poverty and racial
segregation. Table 3 shows that across all one hundred cities, the
rate of neighborhood-level fatal shootings rose by 76% from 2014
to 2020. The rise in violence, however, was most acute in majorityBlack neighborhoods and in high-poverty neighborhoods. Although
the fatal-shootings rate in majority-White neighborhoods increased by 64% and the rate in majority-Hispanic neighborhoods
increased by 58%, the rate of fatal shootings in majority-Black
neighborhoods rose by 87% from 2014 to 2020. Similarly, the fatalshootings rate in low-poverty neighborhoods rose by 58%, compared to an 91% increase in high-poverty neighborhoods. MajorityBlack and high-poverty neighborhoods also experienced absolute
increases in their fatal shooting rates that, despite their higher
initial shooting rates, were still six to seven times higher than
other neighborhoods.
54 Fatal shootings are only incidents that include the characteristic “Shot - Dead
(murder, accidental, suicide)” and do not contain any “Suicide” characteristics—except for
“Murder/Suicide” characteristics.
55 See supra text accompanying notes 45–47.
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The changes in neighborhood shootings from 2014 to 2020
across the hundred largest cities are strikingly similar to the
changes in murder rates in Chicago. The rise in neighborhood shootings has had a disproportionate impact on the most-disadvantaged
communities and segments of the urban population. Likewise, the
convergence of community violence, police violence, and contact
with the criminal legal system found in Chicago is reproduced
across the nation’s largest cities. Table 4 shows that the communities with the highest levels of violence over the period from 2014
to 2020 have rates of male incarceration that are two to three
times higher and rates of police shootings that are four times
higher than the next most violent group of communities. MajorityBlack neighborhoods and poor neighborhoods in other cities also
exhibit higher levels of incarceration and police shootings than
their counterparts, consistent with both historical and modern
trends in Chicago.
CONCLUSION
Chicago has experienced massive changes in the level of violence over the past fifty-six years. Similarly to the situation in
many U.S. cities, violence in Chicago rose from the mid-1960s
through the early 1990s, fell by roughly half by the mid-2010s,
and then rose again after 2015. The murder rate in Chicago is
nowhere close to that of cities like St. Louis and New Orleans, but
the total number of murders each year is higher than that in any
other city.
Despite the enormous change over time, the distribution
and impact of violence across space, different types of neighborhoods, and different subsets of the population has been remarkably stable. As the level of violence has risen and fallen, the group
of neighborhoods with the highest rates of violence in the late
1960s have remained the most violent neighborhoods in the city
throughout the next five decades. This finding hearkens back to
the research of Shaw and McKay, 56 who studied rates of juvenile
delinquency across Chicago’s neighborhoods in the first half of the
twentieth century. Shaw and McKay found that economic deprivation, high levels of residential mobility, and ethnic heterogeneity
predicted high levels of violence—even as new groups of people
moved in and out of the community. 57 Their ideas about the
56
57

SHAW & MCKAY, supra note 9.
Id. at 140–69.
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implications for understanding neighborhood violence have been
critiqued and refined over time, 58 but the basic conclusion from
their early work remains very clear: Levels and trends in violence
cannot be explained or understood by focusing on individual people.
Rather, they are driven in large part by the features of communities.
The most stable features of the Chicago neighborhoods consistently linked with violence have been the persistence of racial and
economic segregation. Over fifty-six years, racial and economic
segregation have been closely tied to violence. High-poverty
neighborhoods have consistently had murder rates that are three
to five times as high as lower-poverty neighborhoods. But the
most severe disparities in community violence map onto racial
segregation within the city. Violence has been concentrated in
predominantly Black neighborhoods of Chicago for much of the
past fifty-six years, and the level of violence in Black communities
in 2020 was higher than at any other point since 1965.
It is crucial to avoid the tendency to report statistics and
trends linking neighborhood stratification and violence without
an accompanying theoretical and empirical explanation of the
link. We began by reviewing research that has been put forth over
the past several decades outlining the set of social, economic, and
political forces that have led to the association between concentrated disadvantage and violence in Chicago and most U.S. cities.
Long-term disinvestment in central-city neighborhoods reinforces segregation by race, ethnicity, and income, thus weakening community institutions and undermining community residents’ capacity to work together to solve common challenges. As
a result, the problem of violence maps directly onto the concentration of social and economic disadvantage.
The response to violence—and to extreme urban inequality
more broadly—has relied heavily on the institutions of punishment. In the U.S. context, this has led to a pattern of compounded
disadvantage, where communities with high levels of violence are
also places where police violence is more common and where a
large segment of the population is enmeshed within the expansive
apparatus of the criminal legal system. It is a mistake to look at
this spatial convergence and simply conclude that where there is
violence, we should expect high levels of incarceration. The pattern of compounded disadvantage is a result of the unique U.S.
58 See generally Robert J. Sampson, Collective Efficacy Theory: Lessons Learned and
Directions for Future Inquiry, in TAKING STOCK: THE STATUS OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY
149 (Francis T. Cullen et al. eds., 2006).
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response to the challenges that emerged in central cities in the
late 1960s, a response that featured the dual strategies of abandonment and punishment.
In Chicago, this approach has not only failed to generate
sustained reductions in violence, but it has also led to both a widespread estrangement from the institutions of the state and the
development of communities where imprisonment is a common
stage in the course of one’s life. 59 The spatial convergence of community violence, racial segregation, concentrated disadvantage,
institutional decline, disinvestment, police violence, and incarceration that we have documented lead us to the following conclusion:
it may not be possible to produce a sustained reduction in overall
levels of violence and community gaps in violence without addressing the challenge of extreme, persistent segregation by race, ethnicity, and economic status across Chicago’s neighborhoods.

59 See Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126
YALE L.J. 2054, 2100–14 (2017); see also BRUCE WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN
AMERICA 131–67 (2006); Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life
Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOCIO. REV. 151, 164 (2004).
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1: AVERAGE NEIGHBORHOOD MALE INCARCERATIONS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS IN 2010 AND AVERAGE NEIGHBORHOOD
POLICE SHOOTINGS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS FROM 2014 THROUGH
2020 FOR CHICAGO OVERALL AND BY QUINTILE BASED ON
2014–2020 MURDER RATES, RACE OR ETHNICITY, AND POVERTY.

Overall
Chicago
2014–2020 Quintile
of Violence Level
First Quintile
Middle Quintiles
Fifth Quintile
2014–2020 Race
Majority White
Majority Black
All Other Nbhds
2014–2020 Poverty
Poor
Nonpoor

2010 Male
Incarceration Rate

2014–2020 Police
Shootings Rate

549

0.06

201
443
1,203

0.02
0.03
0.19

219
1,089
402

0.02
0.11
0.07

1,089
390

0.12
0.04
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TABLE 2: AVERAGE NEIGHBORHOOD MALE INCARCERATIONS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS IN 2010 AND AVERAGE NEIGHBORHOOD
POLICE SHOOTINGS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS FROM 2014 THROUGH
2020 FOR CHICAGO OVERALL AND BY QUINTILE BASED ON
1965–1970 MURDER RATES, RACE OR ETHNICITY, AND POVERTY.
2010 Male
Incarceration Rate

2014–2020 Police
Shootings Rate

549

0.06

256
488
1,017

0.02
0.04
0.16

331
1,158
474

0.03
0.15
0.00

1,242
504

0.16
0.05

Overall
Chicago
1965–1970 Quintile
of Violence Level
First Quintile
Middle Quintiles
Fifth Quintile
1965–1970 Race
Majority White
Majority Black
All Other Nbhds
1965–1970 Poverty
Poor
Nonpoor

TABLE 3: AVERAGE NEIGHBORHOOD SHOOTINGS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS AND AVERAGE EXPOSURE TO SHOOTINGS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS FOR NEIGHBORHOODS IN THE HUNDRED
LARGEST U.S. CITIES AND BY RACE OR ETHNICITY AND POVERTY
LEVEL.

2014

Overall
Nation
Race
Black
White
Hispanic
AAPI
Other
Poverty
Poor
Nonpoor

Rate of Neighborhood
Shootings

Rate of Exposure
to Shootings

2020

Absolute
Change

% Change

2014

2020

Absolute % Change
Change

0.98

1.73

0.75

76.53

0.75

1.29

0.53

70.93

2.92
0.36
0.69

5.47
0.59
1.09

2.55
0.23
0.40

87.33
63.89
57.97

0.70

1.14

0.44

62.86

1.79
0.40
0.61
0.34
0.63

3.17
0.70
1.00
0.53
1.05

1.38
0.30
0.39
0.19
0.42

77.44
74.62
64.69
57.04
66.30

2.30
0.57

4.39
0.90

2.09
0.33

90.87
57.89

1.15
0.64

2.05
1.12

0.90
0.47

78.29
73.65
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TABLE 4: AVERAGE 2010 MALE INCARCERATIONS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS AND AVERAGE POLICE SHOOTINGS PER
10,000 RESIDENTS FROM 2014 THROUGH 2020 FOR
NEIGHBORHOODS IN THE HUNDRED LARGEST U.S. CITIES AND BY
QUINTILE BASED ON 2014–2020 SHOOTING RATES, RACE OR
ETHNICITY, AND POVERTY.

Overall
Nation
2014–2020 Quintile
of Violence Level
First Quintile
Middle Quintiles
Fifth Quintile
2014–2020 Race
Majority White
Majority Black
Majority Hispanic
All Other Nbhds
2014–2020 Poverty
Poor
Nonpoor

2010 Male
Incarceration Rate

2014–2020 Police
Shootings Rate

423

0.06

239
371
741

0.01
0.04
0.16

213
970
383
377

0.04
0.09
0.07
0.05

817
301

0.10
0.05

